Main Menu

Weak Stability and Pareto Efficiency in School
Choice

  • 2017.02.27
  • Event
We propose a new notion of weak stability for two-sided matching problems.

Topic:

Weak Stability and Pareto Efficiency in School
Choice

Date:

06/03/2017

Time:

10:30-12:00am

Venue:

Room 502, Daoyuan Building, CUHK (SZ)

Speaker:

Qianfeng Tang

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Detail/

Abstract:

We propose a new notion of weak stability for two-sided matching problems. A matching is said to be weakly stable if matching any of its blocking pairs inevitably creates new blocking pairs. We then apply this concept to school choice and study its compatibility with the Pareto efficiency of students’ welfare. Our main result shows that if a matching Pareto dominates the student-optimal stable matching for the students, then it is weakly stable if and only if it is more stable than the outcome of Kesten’s efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) for some consenting constraint. We also provide a test for weak stability by showing that a matching is weakly stable if and only if it is as stable as the EADAM outcome which uses its set of blocking pairs as the consenting constraint.